xQuakShell

A remote-access platform that fits in one folder.

One core holds your credentials, host trust, audit trail and sync. SSH, SFTP and a local shell are built in. VNC, Telnet, Docker and the protocols you write yourself plug into the same core as confined processes, and inherit all of it.

Version
1.5.0, released 2026-11-04
Platforms
Windows 10/11, Linux x86-64
Installation
None. Unpack and run
Plugin API
1.0, frozen contract
License
GPLv3, source on GitHub
xQuakShell - live demo
xQuakShell workspace: connection tree, terminal and file panesOpen the live demo

The real application interface with demo data. Double-click a connection to open a session, browse files, open Keys, Known Hosts, Plugins or Settings. Changes are refused. Open full screen

One core, every protocol

Most tools are built around one protocol and keep their own credentials, trust decisions and history. xQuakShell is built the other way round: a core of shared services, and protocols that attach to it. Plugins reach the core only through the capability gate; built-in protocols are part of it.

Plugin boundary: separate processes, OS-confined Built in Shared services VNC Telnet Docker Your plugin SSH SFTP Local shell Vault Trust Audit log Sync Workspace Language Capability gate Coreevery security decision

Select a protocol, the gate, the core or a service.

Official plugin, protocol

VNC

A remote desktop in an embedded noVNC viewer, added by a plugin. Its connections sit in the same tree, take their password from the same vault and sync like SSH ones.

The server's identity is checked by the core through Trusted Peers, so a plugin never decides whom to trust.

Built into the core

SSH

Terminal sessions with jump chains, IPv4 and IPv6, local, remote and dynamic forwarding, and agent forwarding with every signature confirmed.

Keys and passwords come from the vault, host keys are verified strictly, and submitted commands go to the audit log when you enable it.

Official plugin, discovery

Docker

Containers, images, volumes and networks appear under an SSH connection in the tree, with start, stop and the other actions on each node, and logs and a container console in tabs of their own.

It works through the SSH session you authenticated and declares exactly one command, docker system dial-stdio. Anything else is refused and recorded.

Official plugin, protocol

Telnet

Terminal sessions with optional auto-login, rendered by the same terminal as SSH: tabs, tiles and search across scrollback work unchanged.

The plugin reads only the host, port and password its manifest names, and secrets never reach its logs.

Built into the core

SFTP

A file manager beside the terminal, over the same verified connection. Parallel transfers with a limit, a speed cap and a rule for existing files; edit a remote file in your own editor and it uploads on save.

Built into the core

Local shell

PowerShell, cmd, bash, zsh or fish on your own machine, as a tab like any other.

It is deliberately outside the platform's reach: no plugin can open one, nothing is saved, and keystrokes are not recorded. The audit log notes only that a shell was opened.

Third party

Your plugin

A plugin can add any of these, each behind the grant it declares:

Connection protocol
a terminal tab or an embedded view, with its own fields in the connection editor
Discovery
a tree of nodes with actions under a connection
Tabs, dialogs, panels
its own terminal or log tabs, forms, node details
Commands
palette entries, status bar items, a sidebar panel
SSH authentication
keyboard-interactive or public-key steps, with your consent
Tunnels
a new kind of forwarding rule, with your consent

How plugins work

Plugin boundary

Capability gate

Every call a plugin makes passes here and is checked against its manifest: files, hosts, vault fields, commands. What it did not declare is refused before it runs and written to the audit log.

Behind the gate, each plugin is a separate process with memory and handle limits, confined by AppContainer on Windows or Landlock on Linux. Bundles are signed, and risky grants need your consent.

The platform

Core

One process owns the vault, every trust decision, the audit log, sync and the workspace. Protocols attach to it; none of them holds a copy of your credentials or decides on its own whom to trust.

Shared service

Vault

Connections, keys, passwords and protocol fields in one age + scrypt encrypted file. A plugin reads only the fields its manifest names, for the session it owns.

Shared service

Trust

Strict host key verification for SSH and trust on first use for every other protocol, both decided by the core. A changed identity stops the connection and asks you.

Shared service

Audit log

Command history from SSH sessions and a record of what the application did, including every refused plugin call. Searchable, local, password-like input masked.

Shared service

Sync

Connections of every protocol move between your devices and team vaults through your own server, encrypted and signed on the device. Plugins can declare files of their own to sync.

Shared service

Workspace

Tabs, tiles, the connection tree, search across every terminal, typing into several at once and the command palette. A plugin session is a tab like any other.

Shared service

Language

The interface language reaches plugins too: each is told what the user reads and may ship a catalog of its own.

Why xQuakShell

ConcernCommon approachxQuakShell
ScopeOne tool per protocol, each with its own credentials and historyOne workspace, one vault and one audit trail for every protocol.
ExtensionsIn-process libraries with full access to the appSeparate OS processes, capability-gated, resource-limited, OS-confined on Windows and Linux.
New protocolsWait for the vendor's roadmapWrite a plugin against a documented, frozen API, or install one.
InstallationInstaller, registry keys, profile foldersOne folder. Vault, audit log and plugins live next to the executable.
Secrets at restConfig files, OS keychain, sometimes plaintextOne age + scrypt vault behind a master password, with a one-time recovery key.
Host trustAccepted on first prompt, sometimes automaticallyStrict verification, no silent accept, for SSH and for every plugin protocol.
SyncVendor cloud that holds or can read your dataYour own server. Encrypted and signed on the device; the server is treated as hostile.

Built into the core

Vault and keys
  • Connections, keys, passwords and known hosts in one encrypted file
  • Key manager: generate, import, export, publish to authorized_keys
  • Agent forwarding per key and per connection, every signature confirmed
Workspace
  • Tabs with independent lifecycle, tiled side by side
  • Search across every scrollback; type into several terminals at once
  • Scripts with hotkeys, command palette, automatic reconnect
SSH and files
  • Jump chains, IPv4 and IPv6, local, remote and dynamic forwarding
  • SFTP beside the terminal, parallel transfers, edit in your own editor
  • Import from ~/.ssh/config, PuTTY sessions and .ppk keys
Sync and teams
  • Self-hosted xqsyncd, end-to-end encrypted
  • Field-level merge of offline edits, trash, Shred now
  • Team vaults with roles; credentials never shared

All features

Windows and Linux archives, checksummed. No installer, no account.